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Transfer pricing is a crucial issue in international tax law, yet its legal regulation at the level 
of international law is rather limited. Provisions on transfer pricing are contained in both  
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and its US and UN equivalents (Article 9 
in all three models). Their wording, however, is rather general. This leaves plenty of matters  
to be regulated at the domestic level, which cannot properly serve the aim of international law  
in this regard – namely, elimination of economic double taxation. However, Article 9 of the OECD 
Model is developed in far more detailed guidelines developed by the OECD, which are used  
in numerous countries. The OECD guidelines are not the only piece of soft-law in transfer pricing 
matters available worldwide. The author analyses their legal status and on that basis makes certain 
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I.  TRANSFER PRICING – OVERVIEW OF SOURCES OF LAW 
 
Transfer pricing stipulations in double tax conventions (DTCs)  
are usually based on Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
on Income and on Capital (OECD Model), according to which, where: 
 an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly  
or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise 
of the other Contracting State, or 
 the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting 
State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from 
those which would be made between independent enterprises, then  
any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one  
of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly 
(primary adjustment). 
 This provision is aimed at eliminating economic double taxation  
as certain general standards of disregarding transactional conditions  
are developed and bilaterally recognized by state-parties to DTCs. 
Stipulations contained in DTCs based on Article 9 of the OECD Model  
do not constitute a legal basis for primary adjustments. Such a basis must 
stem from a domestic legal order. This reflects an old principle – currently  
a constitutional principle adopted by many countries, including  
Poland – namely, no taxation without representation, under which only 
laws adopted by representative bodies such as parliaments can impose 
taxes. The author’s understanding of the role of provisions on transactions 
between associated enterprises seems to be confirmed by the historical 
development of the DTC between Hungary and the United States 
concluded in 1979, where the usual content of Article 9(1) of the OECD 
Model was included in the technical explanations to the treaty of 1980 
where the parties stated that primary adjustment was allowed and the legal 
basis for such an adjustment stemmed from national laws.  
Numerous DTCs also contain provisions based on Article 9(2)  
of the OECD Model, which states that where a Contracting State includes 
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in the profits of an enterprise of that State – and taxes accordingly – profits 
on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged  
to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which 
would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State  
if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been those  
which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that 
other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax 
charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment,  
due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention  
and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary 
consult each other (corresponding adjustment). 
This provision is clearly meant to eliminate economic double taxation, 
as a primary adjustment in one contracting state (increasing taxable income 
by a decision of tax authorities) shall result in a corresponding adjustment 
in the other contracting state (decreasing taxable income). 
 The wording of Article 9 of the U.S. Model Tax Income Tax Convention 
(US Model) is highly similar to Article 9 of the above-mentioned OECD 
Model. The same can be said of Article 9 of the United Nations Model Tax 
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Model), 
which, however, unlike the two previously mentioned models, also 
contains Article 9(3) limiting the scope of situations where the application 
of Article 9(2) regarding corresponding adjustment is required.  
All three major models definitely lack detailed legal regulation  
of transfer pricing issues. It is easily noticeable that the exact transposition 
of Article 9 of the OECD Model into national legal orders without  
their further development would probably lead to problems that  
would eventually result in failure to achieve the objective of DTCs based  
on the OECD Model (as well as on the other two major models),  
i.e. elimination of economic double taxation. For instance, the concept  
of direct or indirect participation in management, capital or control is very 
broad. A person who holds 0,1% stake in a company that is a 0,1% 
shareholder of another company indirectly participates in capital  
of the latter company, though it does not really exert impact on that 
company. Moreover, Article 9 of the OECD Model contains prerequisites  
of departing from transactional values in transactions between associated 
enterprises, but it does not indicate how to arrive at proper values,  
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i.e. such as can be reconciled with the arm’s length principle. The methods 
of calculating prices acceptable under Article 9 of the OECD Model were 
only proposed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD TPGs). The difference  
in length between Article 9 of the OECD Model and the OECD TPGs  
is particularly striking. Article 9 is less than one standard page long  
while the OECD TPGs are 247 pages long (2009 edition) and 371 pages long 
(2010 edition), though one must admit they do, in part, refer to articles  
of the OECD Model other than Article 9 (Article 25). Similar guidelines 
were prepared by other organizations – for instance the UN prepared  
the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing 
Countries (UN Manual), which was published in 2013.  
National transfer pricing provisions that serve as legal bases  
for the decisions made by tax authorities are frequently based on the OECD 
Model, but they are more detailed than the model and double  
tax conventions based thereon. The details developed at the national  
level – at least in part – reflect the OECD TPGs. New countries introduce 
transfer pricing provisions that - up to a certain extent - mirror the basic 
content of the OECD TPGs (for instance, Belarus introduced such rules  
in 20121, Russia modified its rules with effect from 2012 as well2, Iceland 
changed its provisions to reflect the OECD TPGs in 20143).  
There are other pieces of soft-law of relevance in transfer pricing 
matters. The OECD’s official commentary to the OECD Model should 
definitely be named, among others, but it should certainly be stressed  




                                                     
1  V. Strachuk, Belarus. Report, Tax News Service 10.02.2012, available online: 
www.ibfd.org. 
2  E. Variychuk, The New Russian Transfer Pricing Law, Bulletin for International  
Taxation 2011, no. 11, p. 640.  
3  S.T. Jonsson, H.I. Birgisson, New Transfer Pricing Rules as from 1 January 2014, 
International Transfer Pricing Journal 2014, no. 4, p. 285. 
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II.  TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES AND THEIR LEGAL STATUS  
– AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1. THE OECD 
 
The aims of the OECD, according to the Convention  
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,  
signed in Paris on 14 December 1960 (the OECD Convention)4, shall  
be to promote policies designed: 
a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth  
and employment and a rising standard of living in Member 
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus  
to contribute to the development of the world economy, 
b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well  
as non-member countries in the process of economic development, 
and 
c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral,  
non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international 
obligations. 
According to Article 5 of the OECD Convention, in order to achieve  
its aims, the OECD may: 
a) take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall  
be binding on all the members, 
b) make recommendations to members, and 
c) enter into agreements with members, non-member states  
and international organisations. 
Under Article 6(1) of the OECD Convention, unless the OECD 
otherwise agrees unanimously as regards special cases, decisions shall  
be taken and recommendations shall be made by mutual agreement  
of all the Members. Article 6(3) states that no decision shall be binding  
on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its own 
constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree that such  
a decision shall apply provisionally to them. 
                                                     
4  Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1998, No. 76, item 490. 
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There is nothing in the OECD Guidelines to suggest that the OECD 
TPGs should be viewed as a decision within the meaning of Article 6  
of the OECD Convention binding the members of this organization.  
This suggests that they should be perceived as a recommendation under 
Article 5(b) of the OECD Convention5.  
The OECD TPGs describe themselves as a non-binding measure  
not only in their title – which includes the word “guidelines” – but also  
in their content.  
  
2. THE UN 
 
The UN Manual was developed by the United Nations Committee  
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. The aims  
of the United Nations are far broader than those of the OECD. The UN 
aims to solve international economic problems, and juridical and economic 
double taxation is among such problems. The objectives of the UN 
connected with the economy are just one of numerous other objectives 
mentioned in Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations (Charter  
of the UN)6, according to which the purposes of the United Nations  
are to achieve international co-operation in solving international  
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,  
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and  
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. If one proceeds to further provisions of the Charter  
of the UN, one will encounter chapter IX devoted to international economic 
and social co-operation. Under Article 55 of the Charter of the UN, while 
aiming to create conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect  
                                                     
5  K. Lasiński-Sulecki, Status prawny Wytycznych OECD w sprawie cen transferowych dla 
międzynarodowych przedsiębiorstw oraz administracji podatkowych i ich znaczenie w orzecznictwie 
polskich sądów na tle praktyki wybranych innych państw [Legal Status of OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations and Their Significance in Case 
Law of Polish Courts with Practice of Other States in Background], [in:] I. Mirek, T. Nowak (eds), 
Prawo finansowe po transformacji ustrojowej. Międzynarodowe i europejskie prawo podatkowe 
[Financial Law after Systemic Transformation. International and European Tax Law], Łódź: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2013, p. 345. 
6  Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1947, No. 23, item 90.  
69   |   OECD Guidelines. Between Soft-Law and Hard-Law in Transfer Pricing Matters 
 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,  
the United Nations shall promote: 
1. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions  
of economic and social progress and development; 
2. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; 
and 
3. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights  
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion. 
Problems of double taxation and transfer pricing are definitely covered 
by Article 55(1) and (2).  
The UN Manual cannot be perceived as an act of international law. 
The UN Manual also starts with the explanation that it comprises 
guidance sought by developing countries (p. iii). It does not seek  
to be prescriptive, as its drafters believe that earlier transfer pricing 
experiences of developed countries can be of special relevance  
to developing countries (p. v).  
In the process of creating the UN Manual the drafters attempted  
to achieve consistency of this manual with the OECD TPGs, as they were 
required to do. This attempt to reach solutions not diverging from  
the OECD TPGs was justified by the assumption that there is a widespread 
reliance on the OECD TPGs in both developed and developing countries 
(p. vii).  
The remarks concerning the OECD TPGs’ impact on the interpretation 
of DTCs apply equally to the UN Manual, though nowadays the latter 
seems to be even less likely to be referred to by tax authorities or MNCs 
throughout the world.  
  
3.  INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Numerous issues connected with international agreements and their 
interpretation were codified in the Vienna Convention on the law  
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of treaties concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969 (Vienna Convention)7. Even 
if one assumes that the Vienna Convention applies only to DTCs concluded 
after its entry into force in state-parties of the DTCs, it is still applicable  
to at least hundreds of DTCs worldwide. Moreover, the aforementioned 
assumption, though technically correct, overlooks the fact that many 
stipulations of the Vienna Convention had earlier been treated as rules  
of international customary law. 
It is of particular interest to assess whether or not the provisions  
of the Vienna Convention regarding interpretation of treaties can cast  
a certain light on the status of the OECD TPGs or the UN Manual.  
Under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention a treaty shall  
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning  
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light  
of its object and purpose. 
The term context is explained in Art 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between  
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties  
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted  
by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
 As Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention states there shall be taken 
into account, together with the context: 
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding  
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions, 
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, 
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention recourse may be had 
to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm  
                                                     
7  United Nations Treaty Series [1980] Vol. 1155, I-18232, p. 331. 
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the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: 
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or 
b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Starting the analysis with Article 31(1) in fine of the Vienna Convention 
it can undoubtedly be assumed that the OECD TPGs make it possible  
to reach the purpose of DTCs based on the OECD Model as far  
as the pricing of transactions between associated enterprises is concerned. 
Uniform understanding of stipulations based on Article 9 of the OECD 
Model in all tax jurisdictions may eliminate economic double taxation 
connected with reassessments of taxable amounts. One should bear  
in mind, however, that the elimination of economic double taxation  
is a very broadly understood purpose of DTCs and, at the same time,  
that certain provisions of DTCs clearly do not even allow full elimination  
of economic double taxation.  
The OECD TPGs do not fit the broadened definition of context from 
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. First of all, the OECD TPGs cannot 
be perceived as an agreement relating to the treaty (Article 31(2)(a)). 
Secondly, although the OECD TPGs can be seen as an instrument made  
by one or more parties to a treaty (this can be true in the case of the OECD 
members), they cannot be described as made in connection with  
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties (as DTCs  
are bilateral) as an instrument related to the treaty (Article 31(2)(b)).  
The OECD TPGs were not described as such either in any DTC concluded 
by Poland or in any protocol to such a DTC, although special status  
was granted by means of a protocol to the official commentary  
to the OECD Model in the DTC with Austria. 
For the reasons mentioned above the OECD TPGs cannot be seen  
as covered by Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. If the OECD TPGs 
are followed with no exceptions, the practice thereby developed might  
be viewed as a practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention. Whether the OECD TPGs really follow Article 31(3)(b)  
of the Vienna Convention would have to be assessed on a case by case 
basis, i.e. with regard to state-parties to a particular DTC. It is highly 
unlikely that the whole content of the OECD TPGs will be followed with  
no exception by any two different states (if one takes into account 
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developed economies with the number of cross-border transfer pricing 
controversies high enough to draw general conclusions) and that this 
content will be identically understood in both jurisdictions. Moreover,  
as it will be signaled in further parts of this paper, fundamental differences 
in approach appear with regard to vital issues from the OECD TPGs 
between developed and rapidly developing countries and such differences 
can only be greater in the future.  
The OECD TPGs can hardly be viewed as preparatory work in respect 
to DTCs. In certain cases the rejection of such a view has simple grounds – 
the conclusion of the DTC preceded publication of the OECD TPGs  
in general or at least it preceded publication of a current version  
of the OECD TPGs.  
The remarks made above are equally applicable to the UN Manual.  
The outcome of the analysis of the OECD TPGs and the UN Manual 
presented in this section of the paper justifies the position that neither  
the provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding the interpretation  
of treaties nor the customary rules of international law in this regard grant 
any special status to the OECD TPGs or the UN Manual unless state parties 
to a particular DTC expressly grant such special status in the DTC itself  
or in a protocol thereto. Alternatively significant and uniform practice  
of both state parties to a DTC strictly and expressly following the OECD 
TPGs or the UN Manual in their entirety might, at times, be viewed  
as a practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention.  
 
III.  TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES – NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
1.  POLAND 
 
The catalogue of the sources of law from Article 87 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 19978 excludes the possibility  
of treating the OECD TPGs as a binding law in Poland. Yet,  
the introduction of a transfer pricing regime based on the solutions 
                                                     
8  Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1997, No. 78, item 483 with amendments.  
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developed by the OECD to the Polish legal order was connected  
with Poland’s accession to the OECD9. DTCs concluded by Poland  
are based on the OECD Model and most of them reflect Article 9(1) of this 
Model10. Nowadays, Polish provisions resemble the recommendations 
from the OECD TPGs to a significant extent. Moreover, the Minister  
of Finance when preparing by-laws is – in a sense – at least partly bound  
by the OECD TPGs. Under Article 11(9) of Corporate Income Tax Act  
of 15 February 199211 the Minister of Finance shall determine,  
by regulation, the manner and procedure of estimating income  
and the manner and mode of eliminating double taxation in connection 
with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, taking into account 
in particular the guidelines of the OECD. The provision has its equivalent 
in Article 25(8) of the Personal Income Tax Act of 26 July 199112.  
The OECD’s soft-law cannot thus be ignored in the process of creating 
executive regulations. 
Polish courts tend not to elaborate on the legal status of the OECD 
TPGs even when a complaint should prompt them to do so. Although  
it is at least disputable whether one can plead that a tax decision is illegal 
due to infringement of the OECD TPGs (such a plea would definitely  
be extremely risky at the level of the Supreme Administrative Court,  
which only gives judgment, as a matter of principle, within the limits set  
by a complaint and its pleas). In a judgment subsequent to such a plea  
a court has an opportunity to assess the legal status of the OECD TPGs  
(see, for instance, the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court  
in Cracow of 15 October 2010, I SA/Kr 1188/10, and the judgment  
of the Regional Administrative Court in Szczecin of 9 January 2008,  
I Sa/Sz 615/07). The OECD TPGs are used in the following ways by Polish 
courts: 
                                                     
9  S. Sojak, Ceny transferowe. Teoria i praktyka [Transfer Pricing. Theory and Practice], 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2001, p. 9. 
10  See detailed review of Polish DTCs compared with the OECD Model: K. Lasiński-
Sulecki, Ceny transferowe w prawie podatkowym i celnym. Wpływ powiązania przedsiębiorstw  
na podstawę wymiaru podatków i ceł w prawie polskim, międzynarodowym i unijnym [Transfer 
Pricing under Tax and Customs Law. Impact of Associated Enterprises on Tax Base and Customs 
Value], Warszawa: LEX a Wolters Kluwer business 2014, pp. 77-82.  
11  Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2014, Item 851 with amendments.  
12  Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 2012, Item 361 with amendments.  
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 to find therein the meaning of certain expressions (see  
the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Lublin  
of 20 September 2006, I SA/Lu 96/06), 
 as an indicator of the purposes of a DTC (judgment of the Regional 
Administrative Court in Cracow of 3 June 2009, I SA/Kr 1374/08; 
the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court in Bydgoszcz 
of 22 December 2006, I SA/Bd 650/06), and 
 as equal to evidence measures (the judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of 18 August 2004, FSK 359/04). 
The last approach presented above is at least controversial. Sometimes 
courts simply point out that the OECD TPGs were transposed into a Polish 
domestic legal order (judgment of the Regional Administrative Court  
in Cracow of 3 June 2009, I SA/Kr 1374/08). It also happens that courts 
make reference to the OECD TPGs themselves without further elaborating 
on the topic (the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court  
in Wrocław of 26 July 2012, I SA/Wr 706/12).  
 
2.  USA 
 
The United States of America is one of the founding members  
of the OECD along with Canada and 18 European countries. Despite  
this fact, the approach of the US towards transfer pricing soft-law 
developed by the OECD is ambivalent, to say the least. The US does  
not consider itself to be bound by the OECD TPGs and does not include 
references to these guidelines in its domestic provisions13. From time  
to time tax professionals witness huge disputes over the compatibility  
of US regulations with the OECD TPGs where the US is said to depart from 
the arm’s length principle by introducing provisions that cannot be linked 
to the OECD TPGs (for instance, departure from transactional methods14, 
                                                     
13  OECD, Transfer Pricing Country Profile: United States, February 2009, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/38437095.pdf [last accessed: 1.10.2014].  
14  L. Eden, Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate Income Taxation in North 
America, Toronto-Bufallo-London: University of Toronto Press 1998, p. 394. 
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the best method rule15, commensurate with income standard16). Typically, 
following a few years of discussions, the OECD aligns its soft-law with  
the US approach rather than the US stepping back. 
The OECD TPGs are at times referred to by American courts17  
and applied to interpret DTCs concluded by the US18 (see, for instance,  
the judgment in case National Westminister Bank PLC v. the United States19).  
 
3.  AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia has based its transfer pricing provisions to a huge extent  
on the OECD TPGs20. Australian tax rulings and guidance from tax 
administration refer to the OECD TPGs21. Courts in Australia happen  
to refer to the OECD TPGs, but they do not analyze their legal status. 
Sometimes judges repeat certain phrases from the OECD TPGs, claiming 
that these guidelines make it possible to reach an arm’s length price 
(judgment of Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Sydney, of 28 July 2008  
in case Roche Products Pty Ltd and Federal Commissioner of Taxation22).  
In numerous judgments the courts stress, however, that there  
is no obligation to apply the OECD TPGs (judgment of Federal Court  
of 24 May 2001 in case Daihatsu Australia Pty v. Federal Commissioner  
of Taxation23), the OECD TPGs do not impose the obligation to apply  
any specific transfer pricing method (the judgment of Federal Court, 
                                                     
15  M. Maliszewski, Metody określania cen transferowych w prawie podatkowym Stanów 
Zjednoczonych [Transfer Pricing Methods under Tax Law of United States], Kwartalnik Prawa 
Podatkowego [Tax Law Quarterly] 2003, no. 1, pp. 106-108. 
16  K. Vogel, H.A. Shannon III, R.L. Doernberg, K. van Raad, United States Income Tax 
Treaties, The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer 1995, pp. 442-443. See also F. C. de Hosson, 
Transfer pricing: the break-down of consensus, Intertax 1992, no. 6/7, p. 414. 
17  A. Vögele, M. Collardin, [in:] A. Vögele, T. Borstell, G. Engler, Handbuch der 
Verrechnungpreise, Munich: C.H. Beck 2004, p. 1713. 
18  J. A. Becerra, Interpretation and Application of Tax Treaties in North America, Amsterdam: 
IBFD 2007, p. 92. 
19  Case 95-758T, 58 Fed. Cl. 491 (2003). 
20  A. Joseph, Transfer Pricing Comparability: Perspectives of OECD, Australia and United 
States, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2007, no. 2., p. 96. 
21  OECD, Transfer Pricing Country Profile: Australia, November 2006, available online: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/44071214.pdf [last accessed: 6.10.2014]. 
22  [2008] AATA 639. 
23  [2001] FCA 588. 
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Melbourne, of 25 July 2010 in case SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation24, the judgment of Federal Court of Taxation, 
General Division, of 1 June 2011 (in case Commissioner of Taxation v. SNF 
(Australia) Pty Ltd25)26. 
 
IV.  SHOULD GUIDELINES BECOME BINDING? 
 
1.  MNC’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
The guidelines developed by international organizations should 
facilitate the application of transfer pricing provisions by MNCs. 
Multinational groups of companies cannot obey transfer pricing rules 
throughout the world if these rules are not identical or at least highly 
similar. In any other case they always take the risk that conditions of their 
cross-border transactions might be questioned in at least one jurisdiction.  
It would not be possible to arrange transactional conditions in such a way 
that tax authorities in all jurisdictions involved would be satisfied.  
The MNCs would, therefore, definitely benefit in terms of limiting 
their exposure to tax controversies if the guidelines developed  
by the OECD or by another organization were binding. Similarly, it is also 
advantageous for MNCs when such guidelines, even if they are not legally 
binding, are adhered to by legislators and tax authorities worldwide27.  
  
2.  THE PERSPECTIVE OF TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 
The legally binding character of transfer pricing guidelines  
is not overly important for tax administrations. The lack of details  
in DTCs’ provisions on transfer pricing even allows exchequers to look  
                                                     
24  [2010] FCA 635. 
25  [2011] FCAC 74. 
26  For an overview of other countries and more detailed comments concerning Australia, 
Poland, and the UE see Lasiński-Sulecki, supra note 2, pp. 350-356. 
27  A. Storck, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines – A Business Perspective, [in:] Practical 
Experience with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Proceedings of a Seminar held in London  
in 1998 during the 52nd Congress of International Fiscal Association, vol. 23b, The Hague-London-
Boston: Kluwer Law International 1999, p. 14. 
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for the financially most advantageous way of interpreting these provisions 
without being bound by a highly precise set of internationally adopted 
rules. Yet, the efficiency of tax administrations would definitely gain  
from such a character of transfer pricing guidelines or from their rather 
exact transposition in domestic legal orders (transposition word for word 
in their entirety is impossible as guidelines are structured and worded  
in a different manner than is usual for tax provisions). They would  
not be involved in as many mutual agreement procedures as they  
are nowadays, as discrepancies in approach between different tax 
jurisdictions would occur more rarely. Once tax arbitration becomes more 
common, tax administrations will save time that they would otherwise 
have had to devote to such proceedings. Thus, turning guidelines into 
hard-law would also be beneficial for tax administrations.  
The conclusion that replacing soft-law on transfer-pricing with  
hard-law would be a good solution for both tax administrations  
and MNCs, though for different reasons, leaves one question unanswered – 
which set of soft-law should prevail if discrepancies between existing sets 
arise? 
 
V.  OECD GUIDELINES V. UN MANUAL – PROSPECTS FOR THE NEAR 
AND DISTANT FUTURE 
 
The following countries are currently members of the OECD: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 2007 
the OECD members agreed to open discussions concerning membership 
with Russia. Enhanced engagement programs were open to Brazil,  
India, Indonesia, and South Africa. The number of members of the OECD 
as compared with the number of members of the UN is obviously very 
limited. 
The UN Manual was created, inter alia, thanks to the efforts  
of the Subcommittee on Transfer Pricing – Practical Matters that comprised 
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experts from the public sector, private sector and academia from a whole 
string of countries: Australia, Brazil, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa,  
and the USA. The representatives of the OECD also participated  
in the work of this subcommittee.  
Rapid development of the economies of non-OECD countries, 
particularly China and India, in recent years, along with the development 
of competencies of tax administrations has led to the growth of potential 
fields of dispute between typically richer OECD countries and poorer,  
but rapidly developing, non-OECD nations as to the understanding  
of provisions concerning transfer pricing in DTCs. The problem of location 
savings seems to be the best example of cross-jurisdictional controversy, 
where the tax administrations of richer and poorer countries typically have 
entirely opposite views. This situation may lead to one of three possible 
developments. Either the rapidly-developing countries will gain more 
influence on the outcome of the work of the OECD (for instance  
by becoming members of this organization) or they will tend to stress that 
the OECD TPGs are not binding on them and plausibly will prefer to rely 
on other sets of soft-law which are created with the stronger impact  
of developing countries. Another option is that the OECD will emphasize 
strongly incorporating non-members to join in its work on tax related 
documents, including the OECD TPGs. The documents prepared  
by the OECD are even now being made public at the preparatory stage, 
thus allowing stakeholders to express their views during the drafting 
process.  
 
VI. SUMMARY  
 
There is a huge gap between the hard-law and soft-law applicable  
in transfer pricing matters if one takes into account their size and level  
of detail. DTCs’ provisions on these matters can be described as vague 
when compared to detailed soft-law. One could even risk claiming that 
actual cross-border transfer pricing disputes are nearly always connected 
with the content of soft-law, rather than the wording of the DTCs as such. 
Teams of experts on transfer pricing discuss the details of transfer pricing 
methods that are dealt with exclusively in the OECD TPGs.  
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Pieces of soft-law, though not entirely dissimilar, slightly differ  
and these differences will probably become more significant in the future. 
This may in turn lead to situations where certain pieces of soft-law will lose 
importance in practice while others gain importance. Such a situation may 
be overcome either by attempting to broaden the content of the OECD 
Model and subsequently re-negotiating the whole network of DTCs based 
thereon, or by trying to grant the OECD TPGs special status of aid  
in the interpretation of DTCs by means of, for instance, protocols to DTCs.  
The common acceptance of such changes in international taxation would 
most likely depend on tackling the most important differences in approach 
between the most significant figures in world economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
